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COMMENTS
Illegal Acts and the Discretionary Function
Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act
Between 1953 and 1973 the Central Intelligence Agency
opened without warrants approximately 215,000 letters passing
through New York City to and from the Soviet Union.' Codenamed HTLINGUAL or SRPOINTER, the surveillance project
initially involved only the exterior examination of envelope^,^ but
eventually was expanded to include opening letters and photographing their contents for subsequent analysis and distribution
at CIA headquarter^.^ Copies of more than 57,000 letters were
given to the FBI.4A substantial number of the letters were opened
pursuant to "watch lists" compiled from names submitted by
various divisions of the CIA and the FBI.5The other letters were
opened at random.
In response to public disclosure of the CIA project, several
suitsfihave been filed against the United States under the Federal
1. SELECT
COMMITTEE
TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
SUPPLEMENTARY
DETAILED
STAFFREPORTSON INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES
AND THE RIGHTS
OF AMERICANS,
BOOK111, FINALREPORT,S. REP. NO. 755, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 565, 567 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 SELECTCOMMIT~EE
REPORT].
2, COMMISSION
ON CIA ACTIVITIES
WITHINTHE UNITEDSTATES,REPORTTO THE
PRESIDENT
102-03 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CIA COMMISSION
REPORT];1976 SELECT
supra note 1, a t 567-69.
COMMITTEE
REPORT,
3. CIA COMMISSION
REPORT,supra note 2, at 105-06; 1976 SELECT
COMMITTEE
REPORT,
supra note 1, at 569-72.
C O M M ~ REPORT,
EE
supra note 1, a t 567.
4. 1976 SELECT
5. One estimate is that the watch list accounted for 25% of the openings. Id. at 573.
In the last year of operation, 5,000 of the 8,700 openings were based on the watch list. CIA
COMMISSION
REPORT,supra note 2, a t 111. On the average the list included 300 names, of
which about 100 were supplied by the FBI. Id. a t 105-06. The watch list "originated with
a relatively few names which might reasonably be expected to lead to genuine foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence information, but soon expanded well beyond the initial
guidelines into the area of essentially domestic intelligence." 1976 SELECTCOMMITTEE
REPORT,
supra note 1, at 574. At times the watch list included domestic peace organizations, political activists, scientific organizations, authors such as Edward Albee and John
Steinbeck, and others. Id. When the project was finally terminated, the watch list conREPORT,supra note 2, at 112; 1976 SELECT
tained about 600 names. CIA COMMISSION
COMMITTEE
REPORT,supra note 1, a t 573.
6. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Avery v.
United States, 434 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1977); Cmikshank v. United States, 431 F.
Supp. 1355 (D. Hawaii 1977);Hardy v. United States, No. 76-1423 (D.D.C. Feb. 14,1977);
Siebel v. United States, No. 76-1737 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 1976); Murphy v. CIA, No. 76-
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Tort Claims Act (FTCA) seeking damages for unauthorized intrusions on privacy and constitutional rights. Reaction by the
courts has varied: three suits have been dismissed,' motions to
dismiss have been denied in two action^,^ and one judge has
awarded damages to several plaintiffs? A fundamental issue in
these cases is the applicability of the discretionary function exception of the FTCA1° to the CIA activities. Resolution of this
important issue depends on the extent to which the exception
protects acts of a discretionary nature which violate the law or the
Constitution.

Prior to passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the federal
government could not be sued in tort because of its sovereign
immunity. This sovereign immunity is believed to be a carryover
from the common law notion that "the King can do no wrong."ll
Immunity for the federal government was first recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in dicta without explanation in
1821,12and has been interpreted to mean that the United States
may not be sued without the consent of the Legislature.13 Congress waived the government's immunity from contract actions in
the nineteenth century,14and in the early twentieth century gave
limited consent to be sued in admiralty15 and patent actions.16
Tort immunity was retained until 1946, when in response to the
12 (N.D. Iowa May 28, 1976). Another suit based on 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970) and 5
U.S.C. § § 701-706 (1970) rather than the FTCA was dismissed as against the United
States because the statutes relied upon did not explicitly waive sovereign immunity for
this kind of situation. Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 867-70 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
7. Hardy v. United States, No. 76-1423 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 1977); Siebel v. United
States, No. 76-1737 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 1976); Murphy v. CIA, No. 76-12 (N.D. Iowa May
28, 1976).
8. Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1977); Cruikshank v. United
States, 431 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Hawaii 1977).
9. See Wilson v. United States, No. 77-975 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1978); Birnbaum v.
United States, 436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
lo. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970).
11. See James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI.
L. REV.610, 611-15 (1955).
12. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821).
13. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392,399 (1976); see United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
14. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1491 (Supp. V 1975)).
15. Act of Mar. 9, 1920, ch. 95, 4 2, 41 Stat. 525 (current version a t 46 U.S.C. § 742
(1970)).
16. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 (current version a t 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)
(1970)).
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large number of private relief bills being pressed upon the Congress,17the FTCA was enactedlRto grant the district courts jurisdiction to hear complaints arising from negligent or wrongful acts
of government workers acting within the scope of their employment. lg
Within the legislation, Congress retained governmental
immunity in certain important respects.20The most important of
these is the discretionary function exception, section 2680(a) of
the Act, which specifically exempts the government from liability
for:
[alny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.21

Thus, the government may not be sued for injuries resulting from
the administration with due care of any statute or regulation or
from the exercise of discretionary functions, even though that
discretion "be abused."
The phrase "discretionary function,". however, is nowhere
defined in the Act, and the statutory language does not specify
the extent to which illegal acts of a discretionary nature are to be
protected by immunity. The report of the House Committee on
the J u d i ~ i a r yaccompanying
~~
the Act and the Supreme Court
decision in Dalehite v. United States23help illustrate the coverage
of the discretionary function exception, but they do not deal directly with its relation to illegal activities. The applicability of
the exception to illegal acts was an incidental issue in Hatahley
v. United States,24but the decision's precedential value may be
questioned.
17. H.R. REP. NO. 1287,79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945), reprinted in S. REP.NO. 1400,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1946).
. Ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1942) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
28 U.S.C. 8 1346(b) (1970).
Id. 8 2680 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Id. 8 2680(a) (1970).
H.R. REP. NO. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
346 U.S. 15 (1953).
351 U.S. 173 (1956).
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Congressional Intent

The report of the House Committee on the Judiciaryz5indicates some of the kinds of activities section 2680(a) was intended
to protect, but it is not extremely helpful in determining the
extent to which discretionary immunity protects illegal acts. In
explaining the scope of this "highly important exception," the
committee reported that section 2680(a) was intended to preclude
the possibility of suit for damages against the government
"growing out of an authorized activity . . . where . . . the only
ground for suit is the contention that the same conduct by a
private individual would be tortious, or that the statute or regulation authorizing the project was invalid."26 The exception was to
immunize the government from suits based on abuses of discretionary authority by regulatory agencies such as the Federal
Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, or
the Treasury, "whether or not negligence is alleged to have been
in~olved."~'Since all the activities discussed by the committee
are legal, an argument could be made that by negative implication illegal activities are outside the exception.28On the other
hand, the policy manifest in the first portion of section
2680(a)-that the legality and constitutionality of statutes and
y apply to
regulations not be tested through tort a c t i ~ n ~ ~ - m aalso
discretionary activities as well.30The committee reported that the
Act was "not intended to authorize a suit for damages to test the
validity of or provide a remedy on account of such discretionary
acts even though negligently performed and involving an abuse
This language may indicate that even illegal disof di~cretion."~'
cretionary aets are protected by section 2680(a) as "an abuse of
discretion."
Thus, while some language of the committee report implies
that discretionary immunity protects illegal acts of a discretionary nature, other language seems to indicate that it does not.
Because the language of the committee report allows for two interpretations of the relation of the discretionary function exception to illegal acts, it does not resolve the issue.
25. H.R. REP. NO. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id. at 5-6.
28. See Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 973 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
29. H.R. REP NO. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945); S. REP. NO. 1400, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 33 (1946).
30. See Post-Trial Memorandum of Defendant United States a t 27-29, Birnbaum v.
United States, 436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
31. H.R. REP. NO. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945).

3551

DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION

359

B. Dalehite v. United States
The first significant judicial interpretation of the discretionary function exception came in Dalehite v. United States32in
1953. Although the decision does not deal directly with illegal acts
of a discretionary nature, it provides useful guidelines for applying section 2680(a). In Dalehite, a quantity of flammable fertilizer
was stored on some ships near Texas City, Texas, in accordance
with government plans to ship the nitrogen-based fertilizer to
occupied countries after World War 11. The fertilizer ignited and
the ensuing blazes and explosions claimed many lives and caused
extensive property damage.33Ruling on the applicability of section 2680(a) of the FTCA in a suit following the disaster, the
Supreme Court held that the loading and storage procedures and
activities arose out of the performance of discretionary funct i o n ~ The
. ~ ~allegedly negligent acts-pertaining to bagging temperature, packaging, labeling, and the chemical coating of the
fertilizer-were found to have been "performed under the direction of a plan developed a t a high level under the direct delegation
of plan-making authority from the apex of the Executive Department."3J After explaining that these acts were within the exception because discretion includes "determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or
schedules of operations," the Court concluded: "Where there is
room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion.';36
The Court's observation that the decisions regarding storage
procedures were "responsibly made a t a planning rather than
operational level"37has led to to the adoption of a planning leveloperational level test by many lower courts. Under the test, decisions made a t a planning level are protected by section 2680(a),
while those made in implementation of existing plans are operational level decisions not within the exception.38The test has been
criticized for its undue reliance on the rank of the decisionmaker
rather than on the nature of the decision." Several variants have
32. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
33. Id. at 17-23.
34. Id. at 37-42.
35. Id. at 39-40.
36. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 42.
38. Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1975); Ward v. United
States, 471 F.2d 66, 670 (3d Cir. 1973); see Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 811 (1972)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
39. See, e.g., Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990,996-97 (6th Cir. 1975); L. JAYSON,
HANDLING
FEDERAL
TORTCLAIMS4 249.07, at 12-134 to -140 (1978); Comment,
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been suggested by commentator^,^^ and one court has ruled that
the rank of the official is not determinative and that the essential
issue is whether the decision involves the formulation of government policy.''
In some cases involving illegal government activities, the
issue of discretionary immunity may be disposed of through the
planning level-operational level test or one of its variations, without any need to consider the applicability of section 2680(a) to
illegal acts. Such is the case when the illegal act takes place a t
an operational level, where immunity would not exist in any
event. But the fact that a decision was made a t a planning level
and involved discretion in the formulation of government policy
does not necessarily mean that immunity is appropriate. Where
a planning level decision is made to engage in acts violating the
law or Constitution, policy may dictate that the discretionary
function exception not apply.

C. Hatahley v. United States
The applicability of the discretionary function exception to
illegal acts was an incidental issue in Hatahley u. United States,'*
where horses and burros belonging to some Navajo Indian families had been rounded up by federal officials and sold or destroyed, supposedly in accordance with a Utah abandoned horse
statute.43There was evidence that the statute was applied disDiscretionary Function Exception to Federal Tort Liability, 2 CUM.-SAM.
L. REV.383,397401 (1971); Comment, Federal Tort Claims: A Critique of the Planning Level-Operational
Level Test, 11 U.S.F.L. REV. 170, 181-89 (1976). But see Reynolds, The Discretionary
Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO.L.J. 81, 125-32 (1968).
40. E.g., Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Proposed Construction of the Discretionary Function Exception, 31 WASH.L. REV.207 (1956); Comment, Federal Tort Claims:
A Critique of the Planning Level-Operational Level Test, 11 U.S.F.L. REV.170, 190-97
(1976); see Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 793-94, 447 P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240,
LAWTEXT§ 25.03, at 477-79 (1972); Note, Separation
248 (1968); K. DAVIS,ADMINISTRATIVE
of Powers and the Discretionary Function Exception: Political Question in Tort Litigation
L. REV.930,975-83 (1971);Comment, The Discretionary
Against the Government, 56 IOWA
Function Exception to Government Tort Liability, 61 MARQ.
L. REV.163, 168-85 (1977).
41. Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990,997 (6th Cir. 1975).Recent trends indicate
that more emphasis is being placed on the type of decision rather than on the rank of the
decisionmaker, even in cases purportedly following the planning level-operational level
test. Harris & Schnepper, Federal Tort Claims Act: Discretionary Function Exception
Revisited, 31 U . MIAMIL. REV.161 (1976). However, since most policy decisions are made
by high-level administrators, the test suggested in Downs may differ from the planning
level-operational level test only in form. To the extent it does differ, it may unduly narrow
the exception by removing immunity for "routine" decisions made by planning level
officials. See 56 B.U.L.REV.815, 822-24 (1976).
42. 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
43. UTAHCODEANN.§ § 47-2-1 to -7 (1953).

3551

DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION

361

criminatorily against the Indians to force them to leave land for
which white livestock owners had been granted permits." In sustaining a district court judgment holding the government liable
for damages, the Supreme Court found that the Utah abandoned
horse statute had not been properly invoked and that the federal
agents had not complied with applicable federal regulation^.'^
In its defense, the government argued that if the roundup
was illegal and unauthorized, it would be outside the scope of the
agents' employment and the United States would not be liable.
Alternatively, if the roundup was authorized, official immunity
should protect the federal agents from liability for their mistake
of law, and in turn the discretionary function exception should
protect the government to the same extent." The Court rejected
the first part of the argument, observing that the acts complained
of fell in that narrow area "in which a government agent, like a
private agent, can act beyond his actual authority and yet within
the scope of his e m p l ~ y m e n t . "As
~ ~to the second portion of the
argument, the Court stated, "We are here not concerned with any
problem of a 'discretionary function' under the Act. These acts
were wrongful trespasses not involving discretion on the part of
the agents . . . ."48
Although the Court did not elaborate its reasons for finding
that the roundup did not involve discretion on the part of the
agents, two explanations are possible. One is that the decision
made by the range manager to gather the horses in an improper
way was made a t an operational rather than at a planning level.
Regulations specifically provided the manner in which federal
agents could invoke state statutes to deal with unlawful grazing.
Since the failure to provide the adequate written notice required
by regulation was an error made in the implementation of established procedures, it was arguably made a t an operational level
and therefore not protected by the discretionary function exception." A second explanation, suggested by recent cases, is that for
44. 351 U S . at 175-76.
45. Id. at 177-80.
46. Brief for the United States at 45-57; see Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8-11.
47. 351 U S . at 181.
48. Id. (citation omitted).
49. See Harris & Schnepper, supra note 41, at 174 (failure to follow guidelines as
operational activity); see also Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990,997-98 (6th Cir. 1975)
(FBI agent who did not comply with FBI hijacking guidelines was not setting policy,
discretionary immunity not applicable); 56 B.U.L. REV.815, 821-22 (1976). The first part
of 6 2680(a), precluding claims based on the execution of a statute or regulation with due
care, did not apply in Hatahley since "'[d]ue care' implies at least some minimal concern
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policy reasons an administrator should not be regarded as having
discretion to disobey mandatory regulatory commands.50Such a
decision should be considered as outside the agent's discretion,
even if made at a planning level. In that sense, then, section
2680(a) would not apply because the action of the federal agents
in Hatahley would be viewed as involving disobedience-not discretion.
Hatahley 's rejection, therefore, of discretionary immunity
may have been based either on a planning level-operational level
descriptive analysis or on a policy judgment that illegal acts
should not come within the ambit of section 2680(a). Because it
is not clear on which ground the discretionary function exception
was found inapplicable, the case should not be considered as a
controlling precedent.
In this absence of definitive precedent, the lower courts have
generally taken one of two positions regarding illegal acts and
discretionary immunity. The positions are: (1) that illegal acts
represent abuses of discretion which come within the immunity
provided by section 2680(a), or (2) that illegal acts are completely
outside the exception because the government cannot have any
discretion to violate the law. A third position, which has not been
explicitly adopted by any court to date, is that clearly illegal acts
are outside the exception, but those falling in a gray area of uncertain legality should be protected by either an absolute or a qualified immunity.

A.

Illegal Acts as an Abuse of Discretion Protected by Section
2680(a)

In Kiiskila v. Nichols (Kiiskila I),51the Seventh Circuit held
that an Army commander had violated the first amendment
rights of a civilian employee by excluding her from the Army base
where she worked. Prior to the exclusion order a quantity of antiwar literature had been found in the trunk of the woman's car
while she was entering the base; she had previously mentioned an
antiwar demonstration to a soldier on the base during a casual
for the rights of others. Here, the agents proceeded with complete disregard for the property rights of the petitioners." 351 U.S. at 181.
50. See Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252, 1261 (2d
Cir. 1975); Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 974 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Avery v.
United States, 434 F. Supp. 937, 944 (D. Conn. 1977); Cruikshank v. United States, 431
F. Supp. 1355, 1359 (D. Hawaii 1977).
51. 433 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1970).
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conversation; and she had recently distributed leaflets near a
naval station.52In view of this behavior, the officer concluded that
the woman would probably attempt to distribute literature on the
post in violation of a base regulation prohibiting demonstrations,
sit-ins, and similar a c t i v i t i e ~The
. ~ ~ court of appeals held that the
worker had not violated the regulation and that in the absence
of any "overwhelming countervailing state" interests peculiar to
her job, the exclusion from the base and concomitant loss of her
job were violative of the first amendment.54
On remand, the district court issued an order enjoining the
commander from barring the civilian worker from the base. The
former employee then amended her complaint to seek $150,000
damages from the United States.55The district court's dismissal
of the damage claim was affirmed by the court of appeals in
Kiiskila v. United States (Kiiskila 11)56
on the basis of the discretionary function exception. The court observed that the commander possessed "wide, though constitutionally limited authority to exclude . . . persons inimical to security, discipline and
m~rale."~'Although the officer may have "through negligence or
wrongful exercise . . . abused his discretion by enforcing the regulation [regarding demonstrations and similar activities]
against activity 'too far removed in terms of both distance and
time' . . . to pass constitutional muster," the government remained immune because of the discretionary function exception." On these facts it was held that even a "constitutionally
repugnant" exclusion order was merely an abuse of discretion
protected by the discretionary function exception."
While not citing Kiiskila II, a district court in Siebel u.
United StatesMreached basically the same conclusion in dismissing an action based on the CIA mail project. Admitting that "the
mail intercept activity complained of here might very well have
been unlawful if conducted by private persons," the court reasoned that:
52. Id. at 746.
53. Id. at 746-47.
54. Id. at 748-51.
55. Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d 626, 627 (7th Cir. 1972).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 628.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 627-28. Significantly, the court did not rule that one injured by unconstitutional excesses of discretionary authority is without remedy; it held only that pecuniary
relief was unavailable. Kiiskila I indicates that injunctive relief is clearly allowable. 433
F.2d at 751.
60. No. 76-1737 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 1976).
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this in itself does not subject the United States to civil liability.
The FTCA exempts the United States from liability for discretionary acts performed by its employees, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused. The discretionary acts complained of here might have involved an abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to these acts.61

Similarly, both Hardy v. United Statesa2and Murphy v. CIAa3
indicated that the CIA intrusions complained of fell within the
discretionary function exception, and the actions were dismissed.
These cases would indicate, on their facts, that illegal acts
of a discretionary nature are abuses of discretion within the protection of section 268O(a). Carried to its extreme, this interpretation would immunize any governmental decision which was
shown to be of a discretionary nature by virtue of a planning
level-operational level type of analysis. The legality of a decision
would be taken into consideration only to the extent it affected
the application of this test. The government would be liable only
for those torts caused by operational level decisions; recourse for
injuries from illegal discretionary acts would be limited to injunctive relief and private relief bills submitted to Congresd4

B. Illegal Acts as Outside the Discretionary Function Exception
While Kiiskila II and Siebel hold that acts exceeding an official's authority are an abuse of discretion protected by section
2680(a), another series of cases places such acts outside the discretionary function exception. These cases hold that an official's
authority is limited by applicable regulations, statutes, and constitutional provisions. Any decision in violation thereof is outside
an official's authority or discretion-not merely an abuse of discretion-and therefore not protected by section 2680(a).
A case in which the due process clause of the Constitution
and pertinent postal regulations were arguably violated is Myers
& Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal S e r v i ~ ewhere
, ~ ~ a corporation brought a suit against the Postal Service for negligently re61. Id. slip op. at 4.
62. No. 76-1423, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 1977).
63. No. 76-12, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Iowa May 28, 1976) (dictum).
64. See Post-Trial Memorandum of Defendant United States at 27, Birnbaum v.
United States, 436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). See also L. JAFFE,JUDICIAL
CONTROL
OF
ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION
258 (1965); Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the
United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV.L. REV.827, 892-93 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Remedies Against the United States].
65. 527 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1975).
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fusing to renew six contracts for the transportation of mail between post offices? Facts were alleged to show that the action
was part of a sanction taken against the company for purported
irregularities in operating procedure^.^^ The lower court dismissed
the action, holding that the decision not to renew the contracts
was a discretionary act under section 2680(a) of the FTCA? The
appellate court agreed that the refusal to renew the contracts was
within the discretionary function e x c e p t i ~ nbut
, ~ ~ruled that the
denial of prior notice and a hearing was not.70
The court observed that the Postal Service's refusal to renew
the contracts under the circumstances may have amounted to a
long term de facto debarment of the transportation company,71
and that in such a case due process and applicable postal regulations would require notice and an opportunity to be heard.72The
court also found that the government's failure to grant a hearing
or notice could constitute a wrongful act within the meaning of
the FTCA, and that discretionary immunity would not apply to
it.73
[Hlere the appellants' argument is that the Postal Service has
acted in contravention of its own regulations, if not unconstitutionally, in denying appellants a hearing prior to debarment
from government contracting. It is, of course, a tautology that
a federal official cannot have discretion to behave unconstitutionally or outside the scope of his delegated authority.74

Thus, while section 2680(a) protected the government's final decision regarding the contract renewal, it did not protect irregularities in the decisionmaking procedure that violated postal regulations and due process requirements.
A similar analysis was used in DeBonis v. United States,75a
pre-Dalehite decision in which a district court dealt in dicta with
the applicability of discretionary immunity to fourth amendment
violations. The opinion observed that section 2680(a) protection
would not apply to the illegal seizure of a vehicle without a warrant. "Under the circumstances [the agents] did not have any
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 1253-54.
Id. at 1254-55, 1258.
Id. at 1253-54.
Id. at 1256-57.
Id. at 1261.
Id. at 1255, 1258.
Id. at 1258-60.
Id. at 1260-61.
Id. at 1261.
103 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
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discretion in this operation,-it was their obligation and duty to
comply with the mandate of the fourth amendment and procure
a search warrant before entering upon the premises of a private
citizen."76The case was dismissed on other grounds.77
A similar approach was followed in Griffin v. United States,78
a case dealing with injuries resulting from the release of polio
vaccine that did not meet regulatory standards. After rejecting
the government's argument that the decision to approve the particular lot of vaccine involved sufficient policy considerations to
bring it within section 2680(a), the court stated:
Even were we to concede that discretion was otherwise conferred
upon DBS [the Division of Biologic Standards] by the regulation, no discretion was conferred to disregard the mandatory
regulatory command. In discounting test results that were required to be considered significant, DBS acted outside the scope
of the authority conferred by the regulation. The violation of a
nondiscretionary command takes what otherwise might be characterized as a "discretionary function" outside the scope of the
statutory exception.79

The CIA mail-opening cases present a situation in which the
first and fourth amendments as well as certain criminal statutes
were allegedly violated. Three decisions, A very v. United States,
Cruikshank v . United States, 81 and Birnbaurn v. United States, 82
have held that the discretionary function exception does not protect the decision to open mail without warrants.
Citing Myers and Hatahley, the district court in Avery v.
United States denied a motion to dismiss, finding the decision to
open mail, although "made at a high enough policy level so as to
ordinarily come within the ambit of § 2680(a)," to be outside the
exception.
[Tlhere is a difference between abuse of discretion and lack of
discretion. An official who abuses his discretion, by acting arbitrarily or discriminatorily, for example, will be protected by 9
2680(a). But an official with no discretion in a particular area
has no discretion to abuse; he can only act in excess of his
a~thority.~
Id. at 125-26.
Id. at 126-28.
500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1068-69.
434 F. Supp. 937, 943-44 (D. Conn. 1977).
431 F. Supp. 1355, 1358-59 (D. Hawaii 1977).
436 F. Supp. 967, 973-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
434 F. Supp. at 944.
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A motion to dismiss was similarly denied in Cruikshank v.
United States. The district court reasoned:
[Ilf this country has learned nothing else in the past decade,
it has learned that no man, nor any man acting on behalf of our
government, is above the law. The Government should not have
the "discretion" to commit illegal acts whenever it pleases. In
this area, there should be no policy option.84

Relying on Avery, Myers, and Hatahley in its decision granting judgment to the plaintiffs, the court in Birnbaum u. United
States concluded:
The decision to conduct an intelligence operation by methods which violate the Constitution of the United States and
which also probably violate several federal statutes is not discretionary in the same sense that the decision to fly a supersonic
plane over land or to produce a potentially explosive fertilizer
might be. There is no evidence that Congress intended this exception to do more than free the operations of government from
excessive concern over the untoward, and often unexpected, results of legitimate activity conducted in the public interest.
There is no discretion under our system to conceive, plan
and execute an illegal program.85

Under the analysis of these cases, the discretionary function
exception does not apply unless a decision both meets the planning level-operational level test or a variantg6and does not violate
any regulation, statute, or constitutional provision. Discretionary
immunity, then, would automatically be waived whenever a government decision violated the law.

C. Immunity for Acts in the Gray Area of Uncertain Legality
Because the demarcation of constitutional, statutory, and
regulatory limits on discretionary authority is not always clear,
and factual issues on which jurisdiction or authority depends are
often not easily resolved, the two categorical approaches discussed above are not always satisfactory. While not all policy
decisions to commit illegal acts should be protected as is the case
with the Kiiskila I1 approach, neither should all such decisions
result in loss of immunity as dictated by the Myers approach.
Where decisions fall within a gray area of legal uncertainty, the
government should still be allowed some protection from liabil84. 431 F. Supp. at 1359.
85. 436 F. Supp. at 973-74.
86. See Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937, 943-44 (D. Conn. 1977).
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ity. Two basic approaches are available to provide this protection. A purely objective approach would exclude clear violations
of the Constitution and the law from the ambit of section 2680
(a), but include within the immunity discretionary acts that are
arguably legal. A second approach would provide only qualified
immunity for such discretionary acts, dependent on the officer's
good faith belief or motives.
1. An arguable legality test

In applying the arguable legality test to illegal acts of a discretionary nature, a court would consider only the objective reasonableness of the official's determination that an act was or
could be considered legal. The officer's subjective motivations
and beliefs would not be relevant to application of the discretionary function exception under this test. The discretion protected
by section 2680(a) would simply be defined to include the power
of an administrator to reasonably interpret the law limiting his
authority.
The arguable legality test has a partial analogy in the common law immunities and defenses available to public officials
when sued individually. Public officers are generally granted personal immunity from suit for decisions made within the scope of
their a ~ t h o r i t y . The
~ ' immunity protects errors of fact as well as
of law? However,
all officers, including judges, are liable if they act wholly outside
of their jurisdiction or official authority, even where the act is a
discretionary one . . . . [But a] further refinement
[distinguishes] acts which are merely "in excess" of the jurisdiction or authority-meaning that they are within the scope of
the general subject-matter over which the officer has power,
although he is without jurisdiction in the particular case. As to
such acts there is immunity . . . . [Tlhe determination of
facts which do or do not give him jurisdiction or authority . . .
is obviously a judicial or discretionary function.8B
87. B a n v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-76 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 49899 (1896); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1342-46 (2d Cir. 1972);
LAW
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). See K. DAVIS,ADMINISTRATIVE
OF THE SEVENTIES
8 26.00-2, at 580 (1976) (supplementing ADMINISTRATIVE
LAWTREATISE);
& F. JAMES,THELAWOF TORTS§ 29.10, at 1642-43 (1956); W. PROSSER,
2 F. HARPER
OF THE LAWOF TORTS 8 132, a t 987-92 (4th ed. 1971); Jaffe, Suits Against
HANDBOOK
L. REV.209, 218 (1963).
Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV.
88. See Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135, 138 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643
(1938); McCormick v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263, 266 (1880).
supra note 87, 8 132, at 991 (footnotes omitted).
89. W. PROSSER,
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Another commentator has reasoned,
[Ilf the officer acts clearly outside the authority conferred on
him by statute, regulation or process, he is liable for the injurious consequences of his conduct . . . . But the notion today
is recognized that an officer generally has the duty and the
power to determine . . . even mistakenly that he has jurisdiction-unless the facts and the law are so clear as not to present
an issue challenging "judicial inquiry."g0

While the interests protected by the personal immunity of
officials are not identical to those protected by governmental
imrn~nity,~'
they are sufficiently similarg2that it could be argued
the federal government should not have to pay each time an
employee misinterprets his authority where the law is unclear.93
The result in Kiiskila 11conforms with an "arguable legality"
test as applied to section 2680(a). There the commander's order
barring the civilian employee from the Army base because of her
antiwar activities withstood attack at the district and appellate
court levels.94Only when the appeal was heard en banc was the
lower court reversed and the order of exclusion found to be unconstitutional? In the subsequent damage action, the fact that the
order was not obviously in violation of the Constitution may have
been a factor in the finding that the order was protected by the
discretionary function exception. If the commander's act had
been more blatantly unconstitutional, perhaps the district and
appellate courts would not have been so willing to apply section
268O(a).
The arguable legality test can also be applied to the facts in
Myers where there were indications that the Postal Service's refusal to renew the contracts with the transportation company was
part of a sanction taken against it for purported, but later disproven, irregularities in business procedures. If the facts alleged
90. 2 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, supra note 87, Q 29.10, a t 1643 (emphasis added). See
Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564,575 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483,498 (1896); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1343-45 (2d Cir. 1972); Jaffe, supra note
87, at 218; Remedies Against the United States, supra note 64, at 834-35.
91. See Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 790-93, 447 P.2d 352, 358-60, 73 Cal. Rptr.
240, 246-48 (1968); James, supra note 11, a t 651-55; Note, The Discretionary Function
Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 27 IND. L.J. 121, 125-26 (1951).
92. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U S . 15, 60 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
Jaffe, supra note 87, a t 224; James, supra note 11, at 651-52; Reynolds, supra note 39, at
121-23.
93. E.g., Brief for United States at 50-51, 53, Hatahley v. United States, 351 US.
173 (1955).
94. Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d at 746.
95. Id.
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by the company were true, it seems fairly clear that the nonrenewals were part of a de facto debarment,g6and in such a case
regulations plainly required prior notice and a hearing. Failure to
provide notice and a hearing was clearly a violation of applicable
regulations, and imposition of liability was thus consistent with
the arguable legality test.
The CIA cases can also be rationalized with the arguable
legality test, with the conflicting results being attributable to a
difference of opinion as to how "arguably legal" the mail-opening
operation was a t t h e time. I t could be t h a t Birnbaum,
Cruikshank, and Avery reflect a belief that the CIA activities
were clearly illegal and thus outside section 2680(a), and that
Siebel, Murphy, and Hardy represent a belief that the project was
merely of questionable legality at the time, but still worthy of
immunization. Language from Siebel that "the mail intercept
activity complained of here might very well have been unlawful
if conducted by private personsvg7may provide some support for
this interpretation. Although applicable criminal statutes and
constitutional provisions seem to indicate that the project was
illegal,gRthere is still room for a difference of opinion over whether
it was clearly illegal a t the time?
2. A qualified good faith defense or immunity

A qualified good faith immunity or defense comparable to
that granted certain officials in section 1983100and Bivens civil
rights actionslOlcould also be made applicable to the government
96. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
97. Siebel v. United States, No. 76-1737, slip op. a t 4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 1976)
(emphasis added).
REPORT,
supra
98. Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. a t 972; CIA COMMISSION
note 2, a t 115.
99. In Birnbaum, the government maintained that a sound argument could be made
that a t the time the mgil openings occurred they were legal. I t refrained from doing so in
the interest of deterring future violations. Memorandum of United States in Support of
its Renewed Motion to Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment on the Issue of Liability of the United States a t 3.
100. 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1970):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action a t law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
101. A federal cause of action to recover damages for the deprivation of constitutional
rights by government officers created by the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of
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in areas of unclear legality.lo2In Scheuer v. Rh~des,'~"he Supreme Court held that in section 1983 actions for deprivations of
constitutional rights under color of state authority, officials are
granted qualified immunity in varying degrees
dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of
the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared
at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.
It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at
the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with
good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of
executive officers for acts performed in the course of official
conduct. lo4

In the subsequently decided cases of Wood v. S t r i ~ k l a n d ~ ~ ~
~ ~Court
~
may have slightly modiand O'Connor v. D o n a l d s ~ nthe
fied the standard,lo7holding that the relevant question is whether
a state official

,

knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
within the sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [person] affected, or if he took the
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
[clearly established] constitutional rights or other injury to the
[person].'08

An analogous qualified good faith immunity as applied to
governmental tort liability would turn on two elements: (1)the
existence of a good faith belief in the legality of the decision
made, and (2) the reasonableness of that belief.logThus, applicaa Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4
HASTINGSCONST.L.Q.531 (1977).
102. The court noted in Cruikshank that "[wlhether or not the government should
be liable for illegal acts carried out by employees acting in good faith is not an issue before
the court a t this time." 431 F. Supp. a t 1357 n.5. Perhaps if a good faith defense had been
advanced, the outcome would have been more favorable t o the government. However,
there are indications that the actions in fact were not taken in good faith. See CIA
COMMISSION
REPORT,supra note 2, a t 107; 1976 SELECTCOMMITTEE
REPORT,supra note 1,
a t 608-11.
103. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
104. Id. at 247-48.
105. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
106. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
107. See Procunier v. Navarette, 98 S. Ct. 855,864-66 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1976); K.
DAVIS,supra note 87, $ 26.00, a t 574-76.
108. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. a t 322; see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. a t
577. For an example of a constitutional right not clearly established a t the time of the
offense, see Procunier v. Navarette, 98 S. Ct. 855 (1978).
109. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972);
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tion of the good faith test would be similar to that of the arguable
legality test, with an additional subjective consideration of actual
belief or motive.

IV. POLICY
In deciding which of the three principal approaches should
be used in cases involving illegal acts of a discretionary nature,
four basic policy reasons behind section 2680(a) must be considered. First, the discretionary function exception is said to promote the separation of powers by preventing undue judicial interference with executive decisions. Second, preventing imposition
of liability is viewed as promoting zealous performance of duties
and responsibilities by government officials. Third, courts are
said to be ill equipped to "second-guess" discretionary policy
decisions made by the executive branch. Finally, it has been suggested that discretionary immunity helps avoid the "enormous
and unpredictable liability which could result from judicial reexamination of major executive and legislative decisions."110

A. Guarding t h e Separation of Powers
Providing immunity for discretionary acts helps promote the
independence of the judicial and executive branches of government. Where an official has been given authority to weigh competing policy considerations and make quasi-judicial or quasilegislative decisions, Congress has indicated "its desire that final
decision-making power and responsibility rest in that official."ll1
Decisions by such officials should be subject to the test of the
ballot box, directly or indirectly, and not to the courts' reasonable
man test.li2If decisions are subject to review through tort cases,
officials will "start acting with one eye to possible court questioning, resulting in the loss of much of their independence, regardless
of the fact that they cannot be held personally liable."l13 To avoid
Lehmann, supra note 101, at 590-91. For a criticism of the good faith standard set forth
in Bivens, see Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense to Suits for Police Deprivations of
Individual Rights, 59 MINN.L. REV.991 (1975).
110. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 122 (quoting Comment, California Tort Claims Act:
Discretionary Immunity, 39 S. CAL.L. REV.470, 471 (1966)).
111. Remedies Against the United States, supra note 64, at 892; see Downs v. United
States, 522 F.2d 990, 997 (6th Cir. 1975).
112. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 121; Comment, T h e Federal Tort Claims Act, 56
YALEL.J. 534, 544-45 & n.70 (1947). B u t see Note, T h e Discretionary Function Exception
of t h e Federal Tort Claims Act, 27 IND. L.J. 121, 126 (1951).
113. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 121. See also Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 79394, 447 P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 248 (1968).
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such a result, the judiciary is reluctant "to review the propriety
of actions which under our form of government are committed to
the co-ordinate branches of that government,"l14 and even in the
absence of section 2680(a), it is likely that a discretionary function exception would be judicially created.l15Judicial review by
appeal from administrative determinations may sometimes affect
decisions otherwise protected by the exception, but with its attendant procedural safeguards, such review does not involve the
same cost or degree of judicial interference as do tort actions.l16
The Kiiskila II approach, that illegal discretionary acts are
considered an abuse of discretion protected by section 2680(a),
would further this objective by disallowing review through tort
claims of any executive policy decision. Protection to this extent,
however, may be overly broad. Where policy has been established
by statute or the Constitution, arguably no "room for policy judgment and decision" is left for officials to violate that law.l17Since
officials are not granted policymaking power or discretion to commit illegal acts, allowing suit for illegal acts of a discretionary
nature through the Myers approach does not infringe on the decisionmaking power legally entrusted to public servants, and does
not unduly impair separation of powers.
An illustration of this principle may be found in the CIA
mail-opening context. There, a legislative and constitutional policy had already been established that mail not be opened and
read without a warrant. The decision whether intelligence needs
outweighed interests in privacy was for a magistrate to make, not
CIA agents in New York City. There was no "room for policy
judgment and decision" in this respect, and therefore the mail
intercept project should not merit application of discretionary
immunity. ll8
The arguable legality and good faith tests would also cornport with the separation of powers. Where the exact limits of the
law and official authority are not clear, an officer's "attempt to
define those limits must be [considered] part of the task cornmitted to his judgment."llg So long as his interpretation is reasonable, it should be respected and protected by section 2680(a).
114. 2 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES,supra note 87, 5 29.15, at 1662.
115. James, supra note 11, at 651; see K. DAVIS,supra note 40, § 25.05, at 481.
116. See Remedies Against the United States, supra note 64, at 892-93.
117. See Cruikshank v. United States, 431 F. Supp. at 1359; Reynolds, supra note
39, at 92.
118. Cruikshank v. United States, 431 F. Supp. at 1359.
119. Remedies Against the United States, supra note 64, at 834.
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B. Fostering Official Zeal
I . The need for immunity
A reason often suggested for granting personal immunity to
public officials is the chilling effect that potential liability may
have on the ardor of public servants and on the willingness of
persons to serve in such positions of respon~ibility.~~~
Making the
government liable for erroneous decisions of its employees alleviates the problem to some extent, but it may still "unduly inhibit the exercise of power. The officer's fear for his rating and
his sense of responsibility to his principal may lead him to decide
that a risk of a law suit is the greater evil."lzl The time commitments and potential loss of face in trials may thus act as a dampening force on official zea1.1z2
The precise impact of potential government liability on employees is not known,lz3but if every decision were capable of
generating a lawsuit, officials would tend to be overly cautious
and, in some degree, to work in an atmosphere of fear and tension. l z 4 Effective government policymaking requres maximum
freedom to plan, experiment, and negotiate.lz5To this end, the
discretionary function exception eliminates the threat of tort
suits for policy decisions made within the official's authority, and
thereby removes any stifling effect of potential government liability on official zeal, initiative, and effectiveness.
In this respect, a Kiiskila 11approach would maximize the
zeal of public servants by removing the threat of suit for any act
of a discretionary nature. But there is no need to promote the
zealous performance of illegal activities. The important objective
is that an officer be able to exercise fully his legal authority.lz6
The Myers approach basically accords with this objective. For
example, imposing government liability for the CIA mail open120. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 319-20; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581
(2d Cir. 1949); Jaffe, supra note 87, at 223-24.
121. Jaffe, supra note 87, at 224; see Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A
Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463, 469 (1963).
122. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 121-22; see also Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d
136, 138 (9th Cir. 1975). But see Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 790-93, 447 P.2d 352,
358-60, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 246-48 (1968);, James, supra note 11, at 651-55; Note, The
Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 27 IND. L.J. 121, 12526 (1951).
123. James, supra note 11, at 652.
124. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 121; see Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act,
56 YALEL.J. 534, 545 (1947).
125. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 121; see James, supra note 11, at 652.
126. See Remedies Against the United States, supra note 64, at 834.
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ings would primarily deter illegal intelligence operations, but not
unduly affect legitimate intelligence gathering. Just as imposing
liability for negligent operational level decisions may encourage
greater care on the part of government administrators,12'so allowing suit for clearly illegal discretionary acts may discourage violations of the law.128
Of course, officers should not be "charged with predicting the
future course of constitutional law."129Where the law is unclear
there may be a danger that instead of merely avoiding illegal
actions, officers will tend to do nothing at all. The arguable legality and good faith tests may prevent this result by granting officials a reasonable amount of discretion in gray areas of legal
uncertainty and thus encourage full use of official authority.130
2. Arguable legality versus good faith immunity

The deterrent effects of the arguable legality and good faith
tests are not identical. The good faith standard may have a
greater dampening effect on official ardor than an arguable legality test because a public servant may fear being "hard put to it
to satisfy a jury of his good faith"lJ1 if a decision turns out to be
erroneous. When liability depends on an official's subjective belief or motives, the danger of harassing suits with insubstantial
bases may hinder impartial, decisive a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~
The choice between the two tests depends on the amount of
zeal and freedom it is desired that officials exercise in a particular
area of the law.133Perhaps the choice should be based on the kind
of right infringed upon by the decision.'" For instance, good faith
might be the appropriate standard for applying section 2680(a)
where constitutional rights are involved; in nonconstitutional
cases, arguable legality might be better.135Alternatively, in the
127. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 790-93, 447 P.2d 352, 358-60,73 Cal. Rptr. 240,
246-48 (1968); James, supra note 11, at 651-53.
128. Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. at 989-90. But see Goode, The Imposition of Vicarious Liability to the Torts of Police Officers: Considerations of Policy, 10
MELB.
U.L. REV.47, 52 (1975).
129. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U S . at 322 (quoting Pierson v . Ray, 386 U.S.547, 557
( 1967)).
130. See Remedies Against the United States, supra note 64, at 834.
131. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)(referringto official immunity).
132. See Remedies Against the United States, supra note 64, at 834.
133. Jaffe, supra note 87, at 224-25.
134. See id. at 219, 225-35; Note, Separation of Powers and the Discretionary Function Exception: Political Question in Tort Litigation Against the Government, 56 IOWA L.
REV.930, 976-78 (1971).
135. This would be analogous to what appears to be the federal rule regarding per-
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interest of simplicity, it may be more desirable that the same
standard be adopted for all illegal acts. In any event, deciding
which test to use is less important than recognizing some kind of
immunity for acts of uncertain legality so as to allow maximum
flexibility and freedom in government.

C. Avoiding Judicial "Second- Guessing" of Discretionary Acts
I t has been suggested that the judiciary is not well suited to
make political judgments more appropriately left to Congress and
the executive branch.13The fault concept largely relied on in
judicial decisionmaking presupposes the existence of an objective
standard which may not exist in an area of competing legislative
facts and theories.13' "The normal rules of liability cannot be
applied easily to the unusual and gigantic tasks that few but the
Government perform-tasks such as waging wars and building
flood control projects."138Using the Dalehite fact situation as an
example, one commentator has concluded:
The considerations are too complex. There are big questions of
comparative cost, of alternative technique, and of what risks
must be undergone in the public interest. An attempt to transmute in the alembic of negligence these competing considerations into a judgment of "reasonableness" emphasizes that the
negligence concept has not been designed to handle such issues. 13g

However, with regard to illegal acts of a discretionary nature,
such complex policy judgments are generally not required by any
of the three possible approaches. Under Kiiskila II, once a decision is determined to be of a discretionary nature, no further
judicial inquiry is necessary, and the case may be dismissed. The
Myers approach requires only a determination of the legality of
the act-something courts are equipped to do. If the law violated
was meant to protect against the harm that occurred and the
illegal act caused the harm, then liability may be imposed without the weighing and selection of competing policies.140Similarly,
sonal immunity of government officials. K. DAVIS,supra note 87, $9 26.00, 26.00-1 to -4,
at 573-91.
136. See Reynolds, supra note 39, at 122.
137. Jaffe, supra note 87, at 235-37; Reynolds, supra note 39, at 122; 56 B.U.L. REV.
815,816-17 (1976); 41 WASH.L. REV.340, 344-45 (1966). See Hendry v. United States, 418
F.2d 774, 783 (2d Cir. 1969).
138. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 122.
139. Jaffe, supra note 87, at 236.
140. See Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 527 F.2d at 1261.
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resolution of the issues involved in application of the arguable
legality and good faith tests-the existence of a good faith belief
in the action, and/or the reasonableness of that belief-is well
within judicial capabilities. Thus, the ability of courts to secondguess executive decisions should not affect the selection of a standard for applying the discretionary function exception to illegal
acts.

D. Reventing Excessive Damages
Government decisions necessarily affect large numbers of
people and organizations; some of these decisions "conceivably
could cause huge losses to millions of people."141 While section
2680(a) was not enacted specifically to preclude potentially enormous liability resulting from discretionary activities, it "can, and
inevitably will, serve that purpose."142There is an interest in
keeping the government relatively solvent, and large judgments
could hamper vital pr0grams.l" Allowing imposition of liability
in every case where government employees have exceeded the
bounds of their authority might contravene this interest by increasing the potential for excessive recoveries. For example, in
Birnbaum the trial court awarded $1,000 damages to each plaintiff.'" Since the aggregate liability for the over 215,000 pieces of
mail opened by the CIA during the twenty-year life of the mail
intercept could reach great amounts,145it may be the kind of
result that the discretionary function exception was intended to
prevent.
On its face, Kiiskila II, with its broad construction of the
discretionary function exception, would appear to be the best
approach for avoiding excessive damages, and Myers, with its
narrowing of government immunity, would appear to be the
worst. However, the extent to which economic considerations affect the courts' application of section 2680(a) is not clear. One
writer has suggested that "[a]lthough courts have not always
adverted to this consideration, the results indicate that the possibility of an inordinate amount of liability to an indeterminate
number of people has influenced their decisions."146Another has
--

141. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 123.
L.J. 330, 332 (1956).
142. Id. But see 7 HASTINGS
143. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 123.
144. 436 F. Supp. at 989.
145. However, Wilson v. United States, No. 77-975 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1978), indicates that Judge Weinstein would generally limit damages to $1,000 per plaintiff rather
than $1,000 per letter opened.
146. 66 HARV.L. REV.488, 494 (1953).
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proposed that in cases where the potential applicability of discretionary immunity is not certain, consideration should be given to
the interest of preventing "massive and widespread claims resulting from a single governmental act. "14' Apparently, although prevention of massive judgments may influence the courts in borderline cases, it is not usually a determinative factor.
Whatever subjective desire Congress may have had to pr6vent excessive damages by discretionary immunity must be balanced against congressional intent to compensate those injured
by the wrongs of governmental employees,148and the interest of
keeping actions of administrators within the limits of their authority. Where damages from an illegal act are not speculative,
the interest of compensating the injured and deterring unlawful
decisions should outweigh the interest of restricting the government's potential liability. The discretionary function exception
should not be a bar to recovery for injuries from clearly illegal
acts. The balance may shift, however, when acts of arguable legality are considered. While the interest in compensating those
harmed is just as great as with clearly illegal acts, the resulting
deterrence of administrative wrongdoing may not be as effective
or de~irab1e.I~~
The interests of allowing administrators some discretion to reasonably determine the bounds of their authority and
of avoiding potentially massive recoveries weigh heavily in favor
of allowing some form of immunity for actions in the gray area of
arguable legality.

By enacting the discretionary function exception, Congress
evidenced an intent that certain decisions entrusted to the nonjudicial branches of government should not be subject to review by
the courts. However, the split of judicial opinion in the CIA cases
illustrates that the state of the law regarding illegal acts and the
discretionary function exception is unclear. While two Supreme
Court cases-Dalehite v. United States and Hatahley v. United
States-shed light on the exception, neither case provides a definitive precedent for resolving the issue. Lower courts have generally taken two positions, either (1) that illegal acts are an abuse
147. Note, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 27
.IND.L.J. 121, 128-29 (1951).
148. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955); 56 B.U.L.

REV.815, -817-18 (1976).
149. Notes 129-35 and accompanying text supra.
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of discretion protected by section 2680(a), or (2) that illegal acts
are completely outside of the scope of the exception.
The most desirable result would seem to be a middle position: that clearly illegal acts are outside the scope of the exception, but those meeting either a n arguable legality or good faith
test are protected by discretionary immunity. This position adequately promotes the separation of powers, encourages zealous
performance of official functions, can be easily applied by the
judiciary, and strikes a balance between the government's interest in avoiding potentially excessive liability and the victim's
interest in receiving just compensation.

David N. Heap

